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The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold.
First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals
are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense
activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneﬁcial for the property
owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the
role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However,
commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private
enforcement measures can even be beneﬁcial in situations where there would be no private
enforcement at ﬁrst place because the “shadow” of defense has a negative impact on
the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach
emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which
focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior.
Keywords: Property Rights, Enforcement, Private Protection, Law, Contests
JEL classiﬁcations: K42, P14, P37, P48, N401 Introduction
So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall
ﬁghting; but in the known disposition thereto -
Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13
The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force (Weber, 1919). It protects
the property rights of the people and it limits private enforcement. Weber’s concept of
the monopoly on the use of force has been important in philosophy of law and political
philosophy despite the fact that – or maybe exactly because – the original statement
of the principle has a rather shimmering meaning between a positive observation and a
normative claim. Most scholars seem to agree that it can be meaningfully interpreted as
a normative principle that allocates the authority to justify physical violence to the state.
In the tradition of Thomas Hobbes (1642, 1651), the state’s monopoly can be thought of
as being based on a social contract and it is necessary to prevent a war of everyone against
everyone (bellum omnium contra omnes), but alternative concepts of a social contract also
ﬁt into this line of argumentation.
In the Early Middle-Ages, feuds paired with theft and robbery were a major concern in
Europe, leading to several attempts to restore peace through the laws of “Landfrieden”.
The ﬁrst step was to declare theft to be illegal, i.e., to assign formal property rights
and to sanction violations. However, this was not enough for a peaceful environment
to emerge. An important restriction was to limit private enforcement which included
punishment and self-justice (Kaufmann 1978). According to today’s understanding of
the state’s enforcement monopoly, it is also an important feature that punishment and
retribution are not in the hands of individuals. However, the state’s monopoly goes further
and includes a prohibition of violence more generally.
Feuds were not only an expression of self-justice, but they were closely connected
to the protection of property and repossession of goods. Oftentimes, feuds were allowed
only if a right could not be legally enforced. Attempts of legal enforcement failed in
the Middle-Ages due to the lack of a strong centralized authority. As a consequence, a
great part of the resources were used for appropriation and defense, not for production.
From an economic perspective, the main role of restricting feuds may have been to divert
resources from conﬂicts to productive activity. Consequently, prohibitions were extended
to investments in potential conﬂicts, not only to conﬂicts as such. For example, the law
1of 1152 by Friedrich I included a prohibition of weapons for farmers, the Bavarian law of
1244 prohibited carrying concealed knives (Holzhauer 1978).
Weber does not exclude that the actual application of violence can be delegated to
individuals in defense of one’s self or property, which – bringing the statement close to a
tautology without a theory of centralized versus decentralized law enforcement – gives the
principle more the character of a paradigmatic statement about the nature of the state.
We can therefore distinguish between two conceptual views of the concept of a monopoly
of force, one referring to the legitimization to the use of (physical) violence without ref-
erence to the actual execution of rights enforcement, and the other refering to this latter
aspect of the execution or production of rights. We call the two views ‘legitimization’ and
‘production’ of law enforcement, and it is exactly this latter view that has been mostly
neglected in the literature so far, despite its obvious importance for the evaluation of
institutional arrangements of law enforcement in practice.
To give an example, the delegation of private enforcement to the government is a
highly disputed issue when it comes to the private possession of ﬁrearms. The legal de-
bate circulated around the question whether the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution protected an individual right to carry guns. Generally, U.S. state laws re-
stricted the individual right to carry guns and many believed that states in fact had a
wide discretion to do so. Even with these laws in place, the United States was much less
restrictive towards its citizens than European countries which widely prohibit the private
possession of guns. Wimmer (2003) brings this contrast to the point: “Whereas the Eu-
ropean state had been quite successful in its history in forbidding the (private) ownership
of weapons or to carry arms (openly), that is, in its attempt to disarm its populations, in
the United States exactly this has not been the case [...].” The United States’ approach
has recently been strengthened through two decisions by the Supreme Court. In 2008
and 2010, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protected an individ-
ual right which could not be limited by state and federal laws unless there was a clear
justiﬁcation (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2010).
As a consequence, some state legislation was declared unconstitutional, including a law
that restricted the possession of ﬁrearms by ex-felons (Britt v. North Carolina, 2009).
Other state laws that restricted the private use of guns were upheld, including laws that
restricted the unlicensed possession of ﬁrearms (People v. Perkins, 2009, Hamblen v. U.S.,
2009), guns with obliterated serial numbers (U.S. v. Marzzarella 2009), juvenile posses-
sion (U.S. v. Rene, 2009). How much discretion federal and state legislators have remains
2unclear (Levy, 2010, Bone, 2010, Volokh, 2009). Apart from the doctrinal legal discussion
(Rosenthal, Malcolm, 2010), many scholars have advanced economic arguments for and
against gun control (Donohue, 2004).
The discussion on the delegation of powers has a lot of aspects, including whether
Weber’s view with respect to the legitimization of law enforcement is appropriate for a
state with a potential of a democracy to turn into a tyranny. There are good reasons to take
the problem of abusing power seriously because history is full of examples of states whose
leaders could – to paraphrase Oscar Wilde – resist everything except the temptation to
turn their power against their own citizens.1 However, in this paper we focus attention on
the role of limitations of private measures of law enforcement like private armies and gun
control laws for the eﬃciency of (property) rights enforcement. This should provide us with
a better understanding of whether the legitimization view of Weber’s principle leverages
onto an eﬃciency argument supporting a monopoly of violence in the actual enforcement
of (property) rights. Our approach is not limited to the discussion of gun control. The
more general question is one of self-defense which many state constitutions consider to be
an inalienable right, however, with certain restrictions (Volokh, 2007). The law is much
more restrictive with regard to self-help actions, such as the private repossession of goods.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured party may, on default, take possession
of the collateral without any judicial process; however, this may not cause a “breach of
peace” (§ 9-503). Among other examples, on the patent front, Boldrin and Levine (2002)
argue that more time and energy seems to be spent on nuisance and defensive patenting
of the obvious than on innovation. This is a form of private enforcement of property rights
that, according to Boldrin and Levine, is ineﬃcient. Corporations that own digital rights
have made huge defensive investments in the past decade that have “provoked an arms
race with hackers that continues to escalate” (Bridy, 2009) and even those that favor self-
help measures regarding digital products have drawn analogies to warfare (Dam, 1999).
After enormous investments were made into ﬁghting P2P ﬁle-sharing (e.g., Napster) the
scene seems not to have changed. The Economist (2008) reports that for every song that is
purchased legally, twenty songs are downloaded illegally. Generally, private investments in
security exceed public expenditures on the prevention of crime by far (Shavell, 1991). With
reference to a Hobbesian state of nature, it has been emphasized that the enormous costs
of conﬂicts come from armament, i.e., a diversion of productive resources to preparing
for a potential war; consequently, the nature of a war does not lie in an actual combat
1For brief overviews, see Mueller, 2003, 380-383, and Dixit, 2004, 138-143.
3operation (Kersting, 1996). Is it possible that a monopoly on violence that extends to
the actual enforcement of rights which includes a restriction of the individual’s ability
to self-defend against rights infringements is beneﬁcial from a welfare point of view (and
even for rights owners)?
In this paper, we give the idea of a state’s monopoly a speciﬁc meaning and interpret
it not only as a principle that grants the legitimization, but its actual use of force to the
state (the ‘production’ view). In this sense, it establishes an important nexus between
the use of force as legitimating concept to a theory that helps to understand better in
which ﬁelds the execution of its use may not or may be delegated to the individuals.
In order to do so, we have to specify the “technological” production of property rights,
and we thus borrow from the literature on endogenous property rights that highlights the
contest-nature of property-rights enforcement.2
From the point of view of eﬃcient property-rights protection, at least two arguments
can potentially justify the centralization of enforcement activities (Barzel 2002). First,
there may be economies of scale to or public-goods aspects of public enforcement (Tullock
1967, Konrad and Skaperdas 2010), such that, e.g., a police oﬃcer who is responsible for an
entire neighborhood is preferable to security guards for every individual. Second, private
enforcement may have negative externalities, such that, e.g., a private security guard may
increase the likelihood of theft on the part of the neighbor (Clotfelter 1978, Polinsky
1980).
We advance a third argument that emphasizes the concurrence of state enforcement
and restrictions on private enforcement. The state acts as a commitment device which
allows to commit to a certain level of enforcement.3 However, commitment will not work
2For a recent survey of this literature, see Corch´ on (2007) and Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007).
3Despite its popularity in the social sciences, recent research has shown that commitment on eﬀort
levels is a fragile concept. Bagwell (1995) argues that commitment includes an action by a ﬁrst mover,
and the observability of this action for the followers. For sequential games with perfect information,
he shows that commitment in the above sense may have no value if the ﬁrst mover’s action cannot be
perfectly observed. By contrast, Maggi (1999) argues that commitment has positive value in case players
have private information and the follower’s strategy is potentially informative. Morgan and V´ ardy (2007)
develop a similar argument to Bagwell’s and show that commitment to certain eﬀort levels is impossible if
the players face arbitrarilysmall but positive observation costs and thereby provide a powerful argument in
favor of using a protocol where players make simultaneous eﬀort choices. What distinguishes our approach
from Bagwell’s and Morgan and V´ ardy’s is not so much the model structure but the narrative because
the informational content of a signal sent by a Stackelberg-leader “state” is diﬀerent to the informational
content of a signal sent by a Stackelberg leader of otherwise hierarchically indistinguishable players. We
think that it is in fact one of the key aspects of the nature of the state that its investments in defense are
common knowledge to its citizens and that its actions suﬀer to a lesser extent from non-observabilities in
either the Bagwell or the Morgan and V´ ardy sense, a fact that enables commitment in the ﬁrst place.
4perfectly if state enforcement is combined with private protection. The reason is that the
state will anticipate subsequent private protection, and hence, it cannot commit to an
optimal level of enforcement. In order to isolate this eﬀect, we abstract from externalities
and economies of scale. For the same reason, we abstract from considerations that support
decentralization (self-defense, self-help repossession), such as private information, e.g.,
with regard to individual preferences, lower costs of private defense technologies, e.g.
ﬂeeing, and agency problems, e.g. corruption. Under this framework, i.e. to the extent
that considerations of decentralization are negligible, it is optimal for property owners to
empower the state with enforcement rights and to waive their individual right to private
protection. This results holds for all generic sequential structures of the law-enforcement
game between the rights owner and a potential party that infringes with those rights; and
it is true even if private protection is non-existent in the ﬁrst place. The mere possibility
of private enforcement suﬃces for an ineﬃcient protection of rights by the state. The
“shadow” of defense has a negative impact on the investments in rights infringements.
An application of the state’s monopoly is the prohibition of private armies and merce-
naries. Intuitively, the direct damages, e.g., the loss of lives, seems to be an important ele-
ment for such a prohibition. However, these are not the only costs. Our paper emphasizes
the costs of investments in attack and defense and the potential for using these resources
in a better way. We will develop the economic intuitions for these results throughout the
paper.
Most of the literature has focused on public or private enforcement of rights separately.
There is a large body of literature studying aspects of public enforcement of law (see
Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for an excellent survey). The basic tradeoﬀ explored by this
literature is between the costs of enforcement faced by a government authority and the
beneﬁts of enforcement, which depend on the gains from a reduced probability of crime
and the type of punishment and the associated costs for the potential criminal. However,
it abstracts from the possibility of individuals to engage in private counteractions. On
the other hand, the analysis of decentralized rights enforcement (or emergence) has been
pioneered in the ﬁeld of law and economics and public economics by Clotfelter (1978),
Polinsky (1980), and Shavell (1991), and in the ﬁeld of the economics of conﬂict by
Bush and Mayer (1974) and Skaperdas (1992). Closely related is the (law and) economics
literature on theft (Tullock, 1967, Posner, 1985, McChesney, 1993, Hasen and McAdams,
1997). Clotfelter (1977) focusses on the interplay between public and private enforcement
in a situation when both types of goods and services are imperfect substitutes. This line
5of research, however, does not seek to explain why certain centralized or decentralized
activities cannot be replicated at the decentralized (centralized) level in the ﬁrst place.
Grossman (2002) develops a theory of the emergence of the state that is related to our
approach. According to his view, a ruling elite can commit to overinvestment in law-
enforcement compared to the decentralized solution, which guarantees that no individual
decides to become a thief. In contrast, our paper shows that the essential contribution
of state production of law enforcement is the necessity to commit to lower expenditures
compared to the decentralized level, an observation that may be surprising at ﬁrst but
that is in line with casual observations. Wulf (2004), for example, points out that “[t]he
erosion of states and the failure of domestic politics, leading to endemic state weakness
and collapse, are conceived by a great number of social scientists as the central cause for
war, armed violence and conﬂict. State collapses give rise to and sustain conﬂicts, prolong
wars and complicate or prevent peace building. The Democratic Republic of Congo and
Somalia are used as the classic examples. The most appropriate measure, according to this
analysis, is to rectify these deﬁcits by establishing state authority, particularly the state
monopoly of force.” If there is no deus ex machina that endows a state with a superior
technology of defense, the importance of this monopoly must be traced back to some kind
of commitment mechanism that allows it to devote less resources to conﬂict, and this
mechanism must be triggered by a joint reduction in arming by both, the defenders and
the possible appropriators.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. Sections 3 to
5 are devoted to the derivation and discussion of equilibria under diﬀerent assumptions
about the timing of defensive and appropriative investments. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a state that formally assigns (property) rights and invests resources in order to
enforce them. In spite of enforcement eﬀorts, part of the good protected by a formal (prop-
erty) right can be misappropriated. Rights owners can invest in additional enforcement.
Such enforcement is subject to a contest, where the owner of the right can invest resources
that make it more diﬃcult for a person to infringe with those rights (for simplicity we call
such a person a thief in the following) and where a potential thief can invest resources
6that increase the (probability of) success of appropriation.4
We assume the following two-player contest. The property owner O holds a right R
of value R in a good or resource. In addition, she is endowed with L units of a good L
that is not due to appropriation and that can be used for consumption, cO ≥ 0, and to
defend the formal property right, d ≥ 0, d+cO = L. We call d the investments in private
enforcement of property rights.
Player T is a potential thief. She is endowed with L units of a good L that is not due
to appropriation and that can be used for consumption, cT ≥ 0, or to appropriate (part
of) R, a ≥ 0, a + cT = L.
In order to focus on the strategic factors of centralized law enforcement, we analyze
a situation where only the property owner can be taxed by the state. This implies that
only L but not R can be taxed. This convention increases the burden of proof for the case
of a monopoly of violence. Including R in the tax base would have two eﬀects. It would
partly shift the tax burden to the thief (which would ceteris paribus be unambiguously
preferred by the property owner), and it would reduce the net value of the rent, which
would calm down the conﬂict (which would be a positive side eﬀect of centralized, tax-
ﬁnanced law enforcement). In addition, we assume that the tax is lump-sum. Restricting
tax revenues to come from L and the lump-sum nature is clearly not intended to be
realistic, but eliminates any diﬀerence between the property owner and the state other
than its strategic role, which is the eﬀect we want to focus on in this paper. To be more
speciﬁc, a state C can tax O in order to ﬁnance investments in the public enforcement of
property rights c ≥ 0. In order to do so, it can use a lump-sum tax t levied on L.
Given this assumption and c = t, O’s budget constraint is modiﬁed to d+cO = L−c.
In addition, the state can regulate the private enforcement of property rights by setting
a cap ¯ d ≥ 0, such that d ≤ ¯ d has to be respected by O. This assumption builds on
the intuition that it is easier to regulate investments in the defense of property than in
its appropriation. An example would be gun-control laws that have a stronger eﬀect on
the ability to carry guns as a defensive measure than on the ability to carry guns as a
measure to appropriate property from others (and which is therefore an illegal activity
in the ﬁrst place). Another example would be the prohibition of private armies. All these
defensive investments have in common that they are supposed to defend a legal activity
that is easier to monitor and control than the illegal activity to appropriate property
4See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a survey of and Denter and Sisak (2010) for a recent important
contribution to the contest-theoretic literature on the enforcement of property rights.
7rights. Generally, a regulation of investments through taxes could be easier targeted at
legal activity. Unlike many who focus on the regulation of appropriative activity, i.e., the
activity of the oﬀender, and assumes defensive activity to be unregulated, we emphasize
the regulation of defensive activity. Even though the idea of restricting private protection
is not completely novel,5 the approach has been widely overlooked in the literature.
We assume that the only diﬀerence between private and public enforcement of property
rights is the ability of the state to commit to a certain investment level c. The state
is therefore seen as a commitment device that, if credible, allows to overcome certain
dilemmas of (simultaneous) decentralized decision-making.6 This implies that we make
the assumption that C and O have access to the same type of enforcement technology
such that their investments are perfect substitutes.
Given a tuple {c,d,a}, the probability of appropriating (defending) the good R or the
fraction of R that is successfully appropriated (defended against appropriation) is given
by the Tullock contest-success function (Tullock 1980). 78
p(c,d,a,θ) =
  c + d
c + d + θa, c + d + a > 0
1, c + d + a = 0
(1)
Property rights are secure if p(.) = 1 and insecure if p(.) < 1. θ measures the relative
eﬀectiveness of appropriation compared to defense. It reﬂects the technological aspect
of law enforcement. A high value of θ ceteris paribus implies that it is diﬃcult to deter
thieves from stealing which is common for the protection of intellectual property. A low
value implies that it is relatively easy to deter thieves from stealing which is typical for
5See Shavell’s brief discussion in his conclusion (Shavell 1991)
6See Bowles (2006), Part 1, for a comprehensive discussion. See also Shavell (1991), who assumes that
individuals can commit to a certain level of precaution collectively. Following Schelling (1960), the idea
of commitment has become popular in the social sciences. The prerequisites for successful delegation are
still highly disputed in economic theory. Bagwell (1995) has shown that commitment may have no value
if the ﬁrst mover’s action is imperfectly observed, even if the noise is slight. The result is established in a
game without asymmetric information about players’ types, which implies that the signal to the follower
is not informative. Maggi (1999) shows that private information by the leader of a parameter that is not
directly relevant to the follower (but indirectly by strategic interdependence) can reestablish the value
of commitment because not the signal received by the follower is potentially informative and the leader
may make use of this fact.
7Together with the perfectly discriminating contest-success function (or all-pay auction), the Tullock
function is the most widely accepted workhorse in contest theory. See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2005)
and Konrad (2009) for surveys and Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatic characterization of this function.
For a diﬀerent approach tailored to gun control, see Donohue and Levitt (1998).
8Given that both players are assumed to be risk-neutral, it does not matter whether we give p(.) a
deterministic or a probabilistic interpretation.
8real estate because the good is immobile and rights are easy to verify. Both individuals
are risk-neutral so that their utility can be represented by the functions
uO(c,d,a,R,Lθ) = p(c,d,a,θ)R + L − c − d,
uT(c,d,a,R,Lθ) = (1 − p(c,d,a,θ))R + L − a. (2)
O and T cannot spend more than their endowment, L − d − c ≥ 0 and L − a ≥ 0,
and we assume that L is suﬃcient to make sure that the constraints are not binding in
equilibrium.
Given that we focus on the state as a commitment device, we assume that it maximizes
the utility of O only. This approach reﬂects the fact that, typically, a state is not con-
cerned with protecting unlawful activity, and – from a theoretical perspective – increases
the burden of proof for the case of monopoly of violence.9 Also, it allows us to focus on
the regulation of defense investments. We also assume that the state can commit to a
certain level of investment. This structure portrays a situation where conﬂicts between
property owners and potential thieves take place within an established institutional en-
vironment where police and a court system exist already, an assumption that is natural
for the questions we have in mind. However, the sequence of moves between owner and
thief is unclear and context dependent. There are three generic situations that can be
distinguished and that will be analyzed in the paper.
• A simultaneous determination of d and a is a natural assumption in cases like self-
defense and in cases where investments of the other party are not observable when
making one‘s own investments. We analyze this situation using the following game
structure: at stage 1, the state determines a tuple {c, ¯ d}. At stage 2, O and T
simultaneously determine d and a.
• A sequential determination of d and a with O moving ﬁrst is most appropriate in
situations where the owner develops and integrates defensive measures into products,
which is the case for example with houses (alarm systems, fences, locks). We analyze
9A state that maximizes, for example, a (weighted) sum of agents’ utilities could have an incentive to
regulate private enforcement in order to redistribute between O and T. Using insecure property rights as
a means to redistribute between diﬀerent individuals is a totally diﬀerent legitimization of a monopoly
of violence that raises deep philosophical as well as legal issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.
Alternatively, our model could be interpreted as focussing on two diﬀerent roles (owner and thief) indi-
viduals play in diﬀerent contexts. This interpretation would make it diﬃcult to exclude the utility from
illegal activities from individual utility.
9this situation using the following game structure: at stage 1, the state determines a
tuple {c, ¯ d}. At stage 2 O sets d and at stage 3 T sets a.
• A sequential determination of d and a with T moving ﬁrst seems to be most rele-
vant in cases where property rights have to be established in an environment where
potential appropriators have already invested into certain skills or technologies be-
fore a single owner can start protecting herself. It also reﬂects cases like self-help
repossession where the property owner seeks to regain his good without court inter-
vention. We analyze this situation using the following game structure: At stage 1,
the state determines a tuple {c, ¯ d}. At stage 2 T sets a and at stage 3 O sets d.
3 Simultaneous determination of defensive and oﬀen-
sive activities
We ﬁrst analyze a world without any regulation on private enforcement (¯ d → ∞). This
approach allows us to understand better the role of a cap on private law enforcement.
Solving the game through backward induction yields the following result (as explained






c∗ = R/(4θ),d∗ = R(θ/(1 + θ)2 − 1/(4θ)),a∗ = (θR)/(1 + θ)2 if θ > 1
c∗ = R/(4θ),d∗ = 0,a∗ = R(1/θ − 1/(2θ2))/2 if 0.5 < θ ≤ 1
c∗ = θR,d∗ = 0,a∗ = 0 if θ ≤ 0.5
(3)
Figure 1 illustrates these ﬁndings. If θ ≤ 0.5, appropriation is relatively diﬃcult, which
implies that public enforcement is suﬃcient to deter appropriation completely. Deterring
appropriation is costless if θ = 0 because the thief has no possibility to appropriate
successfully. Public enforcement is increasing in θ because it is becoming increasingly
tempting to start appropriation, which implies that the amount of resources that have
to be invested to deter appropriation has to become larger the larger θ. At θ = 0.5, the
regime changes. If θ ∈ (0.5,1], appropriation is still relatively diﬃcult, but deterrence is
now so expensive that it is better to accept a certain degree of appropriation. Hence, total
public investments in appropriation go down again. However, these investments are still
suﬃcient to deter the owner of the good to start investing in the private enforcement of
her rights. At θ = 1, there is an additional regime change. At this point, appropriation has








Figure 1: Public and private investment in the enforcement of property rights for diﬀerent
levels of θ. (L = 1,R = 1)
neither a handicap nor an advantage compared to defense. For θ > 1, the solid graph gives
the amount of centralized investment in law enforcement. This amount is insuﬃcient to
prevent O from engaging in private enforcement activities. The sum of public and private
enforcement investments is given by the dashed graph, which shows that the owner would
engage in additional enforcement activities (equal to the vertical diﬀerence between the
upper and lower graph) if this were possible.
What is the economic rationale for this behavior, and how do we evaluate it? The role
of the state as a commitment mechanism crucially depends on the relative eﬀectiveness
of stealing. If appropriation is relatively diﬃcult compared to defense, the eﬀect of this
commitment is that there are secure property rights and exclusively publicly enforced
property rights. However, if appropriation is relatively easy, the committed level of law
enforcement appears to be insuﬃcient from the point of view of O. Hence, she will start
investing in private law enforcement. However, the welfare consequences of this increase in
private enforcement are negative, even from the point of view of O (who would prefer to
commit to zero defense but cannot). This apparently paradoxical conjecture is supported




(1 + θ)2 + L. (4)
11The indirect utility of O in case that she would invest d = 0, however, would be
VO(θ,R,L | d = 0) = R/(4θ) + L, (5)
which is unambiguously larger in the relevant parameter range. This result allows it to
determine immediately the role of a cap ¯ d on private investments in enforcement.
Proposition 1 . Banning private enforcement, ¯ d=0, increases the utility of the property
owner O.







The reason for this ineﬃciency is as follows. As far as private enforcement occurs
(θ > 1), we are in a situation where d and a are strategic complements, which implies
that the state can reduce a by a reduction in total investments c+d. This eﬀect, however,
is neglected by O. The commitment eﬀect of the state is not perfect if it cannot control
private enforcement investments by O. Hence, the Nash equilibrium of the complete game
includes an enforcement monopoly of the state, ¯ d = 0. A large θ represents a ﬁght over
digital products and it is exactly in this case that a limitation of defensive investments is
suggested in the literature (e.g., Lunney 2001).
It is in the interest of rights owners if their rights are restricted. Individuals will retain
their powers if there are economies of scale from private enforcement. For example, the
use of violence for matters of self-defense is allowed to the extent that it is necessary. In
case of an immediate threat, the state cannot protect an individual, or state protection
would require investments that are prohibitively high. Also, it is typically not allowed
to use force that is deadly to humans in order to protect property. There is a “duty to
retreat” outside one’s home instead of using lethal force if retreat is safe (Volokh, 2007).
4 Sequential determination of defensive and oﬀensive
activities, defender moves ﬁrst
In this case, O determines d at stage 2, and T determines a at stage 3. We are look-
ing for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of this game. The solution of this game can be
trivially deduced from the analysis of the last section because the sequential structure
12of investments implies that O has in fact a commitment device that makes any cen-
tralized investments in law enforcement redundant. Both decentralized and centralized
investments in law enforcement lead to the same outcome with a continuous number of
equilibria c+d = d∗. Such a neutrality result does not give strong support for a monopoly
of violence, but it does not stand in its way either. In this case, the fact that defensive
measures, like alarm systems, locks, fences, passwords etc. are not prohibited may be best
explained by private information with regard to the value of the property to be protected
(Tullock, 1967, Shavell, 1991).
5 Sequential determination of defensive and oﬀensive
activities, oﬀender moves ﬁrst
In this case, T determines a at stage 2, and O determines d at stage 3. We are looking
for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of this game, and the game is solved by backwards
induction, again without any cap ﬁrst (¯ d → ∞).
The solution of this game builds on the intuitions developed by Yildirim (2005). Solving
O’s stage 3 optimization problem yields the following reaction function:
d(R,L,θ,a,c) = max[0,
√
Rθa − θa − c]. (6)
Following Dixit (1987), player T is called favorite if the equilibrium share appropriated
exceeds 0.5 in a simultaneous Nash equilibrium and underdog otherwise. Baik and Shogren
(1992) and Leininger (1993) analyze contests with endogenous moves and show that both
players unanimously want to commit to a sequential structure where the underdog moves
ﬁrst if this is possible. This commitment utilizes the fact that, from the point of view
of the underdog, both investments in the contest are strategic substitutes, which implies
that he reduces investments relative to the simultaneous game. For the contest-success
function employed in this paper, T is the underdog if and only if θ < 1 and O is the
underdog if and only if θ > 1 (Kolmar 2008). For θ < 1 the state can create a situation
where T (the underdog) moves ﬁrst by setting c = 0. In this case, a sequential game results
where a is determined before d. Denote the resulting investments by a′, d′. If c increases,
we know from (6) that d is linearly reduced to d′−c until the constraint becomes binding.
Up to this point, a shift in the structure of c + d has no inﬂuence on T’s choice of a′, he
eﬀectively retains his ﬁrst-mover position. We therefore get multiple equilibria that share
13the property that c+d and a are constant. For θ > 1 the situation is diﬀerent. An analysis
of this situation leads to the following solution.
Lemma 1 . If θ ≤ 1, c(θ,R,L) + d(θ,R,L) = (2 − θ)Rθ/4, a(θ,R,L) = Rθ/4 is
the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium paths. Public and private enforcement are perfect
substitutes, there are positive investments in appropriation, and property rights are in-
secure. If θ > 1 the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium path is c(θ,R,L) = (Rθ)/(1 +
θ)2, a(θ,R,L) = (Rθ)/(1+θ)2, d(θ,R,L) = 0. There is public but no private enforce-
ment of property rights. Property rights are insecure.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given the analysis of the last section which has shown that private enforcement of
property rights is problematic even for the property owner O if appropriation is a strategic
complement to defense, and that this case is fulﬁlled if and only if θ > 1 in a Tullock
contest, we can state the following proposition without further proof.
Proposition 2 . Banning private enforcement, ¯ d=0, increases the utility of the property
owner O if θ > 1 and leaves his utility unchanged if θ ≤ 1.
Banning private enforcement is therefore neutral if T is the underdog but plays an impor-
tant role if T is the favorite. Figure 2 illustrates these ﬁndings. The left panel displays

















Figure 2: Public and private investment in the enforcement of property rights (left panel)
and indirect utility (right panel) for diﬀerent levels of θ (sequential a and d, L = 1,R = 1).
investments in the contest. For θ < 1, the solid graph measures defensive investments
c + d as a function of θ, the dotted graph appropriative investments in enforcement. For
14θ < 1, the state uses its strategic advantage to delegate the Stackelberg-leader position
to T by reducing investments below or up to the Stackelberg-follower investments. This
allows a strategic commitment of investments which is proﬁtable for both O and T. The
scenario changes if θ > 1. For larger values of θ, the state would like to use its ﬁrst move
to (under-) commit to certain investments, but is constrained by the incentives of O to
invest in private enforcement at stage 3. The solid graph measures c+d as well as a in case
no banning of private enforcement is possible. The dotdashed graph measures c and the
dashed graph measures a in case a ban of private enforcement is possible, ¯ d = 0. As one
can see, banning private enforcement reduces total investments in this contest because
it allows the state to use its potential ﬁrst-mover advantage by reducing investments in
c. This conjecture is further supported by the right panel of Figure 2 that displays the
maximum utility for O. The case θ < 1 needs no further discussion. If θ > 1 the solid line
gives the maximum utility of O if private enforcement can be banned and the dashed line
gives the maximum utility without any such ban.
This ﬁnding looks similar to the one derived for the ﬁrst model, and the economic
mechanism to ban private enforcement in order to be able to commit to reduce investments
in the enforcement of property rights is the same. However, from an empirical point of
view, both scenarios diﬀer in a very important aspect. In the ﬁrst model, a ban of private
enforcement actually reduces private enforcement investments. In this model, there is no
private enforcement in the ﬁrst place, which implies that a formal ban may appear rather
awkward. Nevertheless, a formal ban of private enforcement is necessary for a desirable
reduction in public investments in the enforcement of property rights. It is the threat or
the ‘shadow’ of private enforcement that forces the state to overinvest in enforcement.
Our results reﬂect the fact that self-help in order to repossess a good is widely restricted
by the law. Narrow exceptions include the possession of a good by a secured party if the
debtor defaults. However, this may not lead to a “breach of peace” (U.C.C. § 9-503).
Typically, the law requires state action to be inadequate, and thus, self-help repossession
to be necessary. In MBank El Paso v. Sanchez, the court considered (among other issues)
the repossession of a car, where the owner locked herself inside, a breach of peace, hence,
the repossession was unlawful. The law seems to require (signiﬁcant) economies of scale
from the private actions. Absent such economies of scale, it makes sense for the property
owners to delegate enforcement to the state.
156 Concluding Remarks
We have been able to show that in a situation where the state is interpreted as a com-
mitment device, a ban on private enforcement of property rights is an important feature
of optimal state enforcement. Clearly, there are circumstances where private defense is
important and to which the right of self-defense applies. However, excluding enforcement
activity for which individuals are better suited (private information, lower costs) and
abstracting from agency problems, it is optimal for property owners to delegate their en-
forcement activity to the state completely, even if state enforcement has no economies of
scale and there are no negative externalities from individual law-enforcement activities.
This result holds for all generic sequential structures of the law-enforcement game. From
the state’s point of view (and thus from the property owner’s point of view), the “threat”
of private enforcement is obstructive and it is even useful to prohibit private enforcement
activities in a situation where they would not exist at ﬁrst place.
The private enforcement of rights has been of considerable importance historically, for ex-
ample in medieval Europe. One of the key factors for the economic success of renaissance
Europe had been the development of a code of conduct called the “Lex Mercatoria” in
the 11th and 12th century. It helped to overcome the limited possibilities of centralized
law enforcement in a politically fragmented Europe. According to Berman (1983), “[t]his
legal system’s rules were privately produced, privately adjudicated, and privately enforced”.
This system became eﬀective exactly because medieval Europe was plagued by a maze
of fragmented states whose rulers more closely resembled self-interested elites (Berman
1983). To abstract from those agency problems in this paper assumes an environment
where property owners have managed to establish a well-functioning state, and our the-
ory is therefore not able to explain the emergence of such a state or the conditions under
which it prevails. The reach of our analysis is more limited: if such a well-functioning state
exists, we can explain why Weber’s concept of a monopoly of violence that is usually inter-
preted as a principle that locates the legitimization of the use of (physical) violence with
the state leverages onto the material investments into (property) rights enforcements. In
those states, the use of private armies and mercenaries is prohibited, self-defense mea-
sures are regulated, and self-help actions to regain goods without court intervention are
widely restricted. From a law-enforcement perspective, it is important to emphasize that
the role of the state is not limited to directly regulating criminal activity, but it includes
the regulation of victim activity on a fundamental level.
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Appendix A: Solution of the game where O and T move
simultaneously






(c + d + θa)2R − 1 ≤ 0 ∧ d ≥ 0 ∧
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(c + d + θa)2R − 1
 





(c + d + θa)2R − 1 ∧ a ≥ 0 ∧
 
θ(c + d)
(c + d + θa)2R − 1
 
a = 0. (A.2)






(1+θ)2 − c, a = θR
(1+θ)2 ifc ≤ θR/(1 + θ)2
d = 0, a =
√
Rθ3(c+d)−θ(c+d)
θ2 ifθR/(1 + θ)2 < c ≤ θR
d = 0,a = 0 ifθR < c
(A.3)
Inserting these values into p(.) reveals that, depending on on the amount of public enforce-
ment, we may get equilibria where private and public enforcement interact and property
rights are uncertain, where there is only public enforcement but still uncertain property
rights, and where there is only public enforcement and perfectly secure property rights.




   
   
R
(1 + θ)
2 + L, c ≤ θR/(1 + θ)2
 
Rc
θ + L − c, θR/(1 + θ)2 < c ≤ θR
(1 − θ)R + L − c, θR < c
(A.4)
Maximizing (A.4) with respect to c leads to the following solution:
1. If c ≤ θR/(1 + θ)2, the state is indiﬀerent between all levels of c because c and
d are perfect substitutes and there is no cost-shifting from O to T with public
enforcement. We will use the convention that there is public law enforcement in this
case of indiﬀerence, c∗ = (θR)/(1 + θ)2.
2. If θR/(1 + θ)2 < c ≤ θR, the ﬁrst-order condition of vO with respect to c implies
that the state would choose c = R/(4θ). However, this solution is only consistent
with θR/(1 + θ)2 < c ≤ θR iﬀ 0.5 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
3. If θR < c, law enforcement is suﬃciently large to deter T from appropriation. The
minimum investment that induces a = 0 is c = θR. Larger values of c are a waste
of resources.
Combining these ﬁndings leads to (3).
Appendix B: Technical intuition of Proposition 1
At stage 2, both players play a simultaneous game. Hence, O does not take into consid-
eration the eﬀect of her choice of d on a. This eﬀect is, however, taken into consideration



















The ﬁrst term is equal to zero because of the ﬁrst-order condition of the stage-2 optimiza-




































This leads to the following conclusion, given that ∂p(c∗,d∗,a∗)/∂a < 0 and
∂2p(c∗,d∗,a∗)/∂a







The eﬀect on a that is not internalized by O when choosing d depends on the cross partial
derivative of the contest success function: if d and a are strategic complements (positive
cross partial derivative), a reduction of d will induce a reduction of a, whereas the opposite
is true if d and a are strategic substitutes (negative cross partial derivative). For the case






R 0 ⇔ θ S 1.
Hence, we are in a situation where d and a are strategic complements if θ > 1, which
implies that the state can reduce a by a reduction in total investments c + d. This eﬀect,
however, is neglected by O.
The commitment eﬀect of the state is not perfect if it cannot control private enforce-
ment investments by O. This result allows it to immediately determine the role of a cap
¯ d on private investments in enforcement.
Corollary B.1: Private investments in the enforcement of property rights
occur if and only if θ > 1. Banning private enforcement increases the utility
of O because appropriation is a strategic complement to defense.
Given that private enforcement in property rights plays only a role when a and d are
strategic complements, it is always optimal from the point of view of the state to ban
private enforcement completely, if this is a viable opportunity. Hence, the Nash equilibrium
of the complete game including ¯ d always has ¯ d = 0 as part of the equilibrium strategy of
the state. This result holds even though the state is a perfect advocate of the interests of
the property owner.
23Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For θ < 1 the state can create a situation where T (the underdog) moves ﬁrst by
setting c = 0. An analysis of this situation leads to the following solution:
c(θ,R,L) = 0, a(θ,R,L) =
Rθ
4




VO(θ,R,L) = R(1 − 0.5θ)




However, for θ > 1 the situation is diﬀerent: O is the underdog, and there is therefore a
value of commitment to let her move ﬁrst. However, such a commitment is not credible in
this case because with ¯ d → ∞, the owner simply cannot credibly commit not to invest at
stage 3. Denote by dsim,asim the equilibrium of a simultaneous two-player contest and by
dseq,aseq,cseq. We can then show that the equilibrium of the three-stage sequential game is
structurally identical to the simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium in the following sense:
cseq = dsim, aseq = asim, dseq = 0. We ﬁrst prove that this is an equilibrium and then
continue to show that it is only subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Given cseq = dsim and aseq = asim at the ﬁrst two stages, it follows from (6) that it is
optimal for O to choose dseq = 0. Given that the state invested cseq = dsim in stage one,
investing more than aseq = asim cannot reduce total investments c+d because c is already
sunk and d will be zero. So increasing a is never proﬁtable. Reducing investments below
aseq = asim can also never be optimal because T is on her reaction function given that d
is zero. The state has never an incentive to invest more than cseq = dsim because it would
like to use its ﬁrst-mover advantage to commit (the owner is the underdog). If the state
invests less than cseq = dsim, T would, diﬀerent to the case where the game ends after this
move, increase investments in order to deter O to start investing in the contest: It follows
from (6) that d(R,L,θ,aseq = asim,cseq = dsim) is exactly equal to zero at this point,
which implies that for unchanged a, d would be increased one by one with a reduction in
c, holding the outcome unchanged. However, ∂d(R,L,θ,aseq = asim,cseq = dsim)/∂a < 0,
which implies that T can use a reduction in c to improve its position by increasing a (T is
the favorite), which cannot be optimal for O. Because both players have a unique optimal
strategy in each round, this the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Lemma 1 follows
immediately.
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